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Investigations in Operation:
SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE
DONALD C. COOKt
I. CREATION AND FUNCTIONO N JUNE 25, 1950, the "cold war" ended with the invasion of
South Korea. On July 17, 195o, there was established the Senate
Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, of which Senator
Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas is Chairman. The intention of the Armed
Services Committee in creating the Subcommittee "was, in large measure
to reactivate the War Investigating Committee, or Truman Commit-
tee. .. ." The function of the Subcommittee is to exercise a "continuous
watchfulness over matters within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services
Committee [of the Senate] ..... 2 That jurisdiction relates, among other
things, to (i) the common defense generally, (2) the Department of De-
fense and the Armed Services, generally, and (3) the strategic and critical
materials necessary for the common defense. 3 The purposes of such watch-
fulness and study include "the determination whether (i) policies, pro-
grams, activities, requirements and practices (of the Department of De-
fense, the Armed Services, and related defense agencies) are the most ef-
fective possible in the interest of the national defense, and (2) the admin-
istration of such (activities) is characterized by maximum efficiency. ' ' 4
The Subcommittee, which consists of four Democrats and three Re-
t Vice-Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission; Chief Counsel, Senate Armed
Services Subcommittee on Preparedness.
I First Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Sen. Doc. No. 230, 81st Congress 2nd Sess. 1 (1950). The Truman Committee, created in 1941,
was a special committee. At that time, no committee of either the Senate or the House of Repre-
sentatives had the duty to watch whether or not any law which Congress had enacted was
being properly administered. This was corrected in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
6o Stat. 812 et seq. (1946). Section 136 of that Act provides, in part, that "each standing com-
mittee... shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such
committee.... ." 6o Stat. 832 (1946).
2 Resolution of July 17, 1950, of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
3 6o Stat. 8iS (1946).
4 Resolution of the Senate Committee on Armed Services (July 17, 1950).
s Lyndon B. Johnson (Tex.), Virgil M. Chapman (Ky.), Lester C. Hunt (Wyo.), and Estes
Kefauver (Tenn.)
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publicans,6 is nonpartisan in its outlook and policies. It goes to great
lengths to obtain unanimity so that the public may be presented with
uncolored facts. Most important of all, the Subcommittee endeavors to
avoid second-guessing by refusing to establish itself as a Monday-morn-
ing-quarterback club of battlefield strategy. It does not tell generals and
admirals how to fight, but, rather, makes certain that they and the men
fighting under them have what they need to win battles.
II. Plocmups EMPLOYED BY T SUBCoMMITTEE
The resolution establishing the "watchdog" Subcommittee authorized
it to employ the procedures normally adopted in conducting an investiga-
tion. Thus, it is authorized, as it deems advisable, (i) to hold hearings at
any time and at any place, (2) to employ investigators and technical as-
sistants, (3) to make investigations, (4) to administer oaths, (5) to take
testimony, and (6) to require by subpoena, or otherwise, the attendance
of witnesses and the production of correspondence, books, papers, and
documents.
In practice, the Subcommittee has not found it necessary to conduct
elaborate hearings where witnesses are interrogated at great length. In
most instances, the staff of the Subcommittee will request the head of a
department or agency to furnish such information or documents as pertain
to the matter under investigation. Almost invariably the documents are
promptly produced. Occasionally, the produced documentary material is
not as fully informative as the Subcommittee believes is necessary to
evaluate properly the matter under investigation. In that circumstance,
the personnel of the department or agency are informally questioned by
the investigators of the Subcommittee and the full facts thereby obtained.
If the matter under investigation pertains to an activity of a member of
the public, he is always requested to supply such data as the Subcommit-
tee believes is pertinent and necessary to the inquiry. In addition, he will
be given the opportunity to explain his position in order that all persons
affected by the investigation may have a fair hearing. Such explanations
are sometimes made informally to a staff member of the Subcommittee.
Occasionally, the explanations are made at a formal hearing before the
Subcommittee in executive session. Since it is a policy announced by
Senator Johnson at the first meeting of the Subcommittee to develop the
substantial rather than to exploit the sensational, very rarely are the
hearings public. In this manner the statements of the witnesses are not
immediately published in the press, so that presentation of an incomplete,
6 Styles Bridges (N.H.), Wayne Morse (Ore.), and Leverett Saltonstall (Mass.).
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and therefore distorted, picture is avoided. After the investigation is com-
pleted, those departments, agencies, and members of the public affected
are shown a draft of the report for the purpose of affording them an op-
portunity to correct any mistakes of fact that might inadvertently have
been set forth. It is only after this that the report is made public.
III. "SUmRLus" PROPERTY
I. SYNTHIETIC RUBBER PRODUCING PLANTS
On July 28, 195o, before the Subcommittee held its initial meeting, its
Chairman learned of the imminent sale by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (RFC) of a government-owned synthetic rubber plant at
Akron, Ohio. Immediately upon learning of the proposed sale, on July 29,
1950, the Chairman of the Subcommittee wrote to the RFC and urged it
not to sell the plant. A copy of the letter was sent to the National Security
Resources Board (NSRB) which had previously given its approval,7 pro-
vided a clause was inserted in the contract requiring the purchaser to
make it capable of producing synthetic rubber within four months after
notification by the government that such action was required.
On August 3, 1950, the NSRB advised the Chairman that, after dis-
cussing the matter with the Office of the President and the RFC, it was
decided that the plant would not be sold. On August 22, I95O, the Chair-
man of the Subcommittee wrote the Assistant to the President and, among
other things, urged that all government-owned synthetic rubber produc-
ing plants be reactivated immediately. Thereafter, on August 24, 1950,
the NSRB advised the RFC that no plants capable of producing synthetic
rubber should be sold since the government might decide to place them in
production. Finally, on September i, i95o, the White House advised the
Subcommittee that the Akron plant, as well as all other government-
owned synthetic rubber producing plants, would be immediately reacti-
vated and placed in operation.
Thus, even before the Subcommittee was fully organized, it took steps,
through its Chairman, to prevent the sale of government-owned plants
and their conversion into nonmilitary uses and to cause them to be re-
activated for the production of a material vital to our defense needs.
2. "SURPLUS" SALES AT ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE (GEORGIA)
On August 9, 195o, Senator Russell, then a member and now chairman
of the full Armed Services Committee, was advised by a constituent that
7 Such approval is required by the Rubber Stamp Act of 1948, 62 Stat. ioi (1948), 5o
U.S.C.A. § 1921 et seq. (Supp., i95o).
SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE
the Air Force was selling unused airplane motors and other airplane ma-
terials at its Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. Upon inquiry, the Sub-
committee was advised by the Air Force on August 15, 1950, that instruc-
tions had been issued on July io, 1950, to all Air Force bases suspending
all disposal action within the continental United States except for items
known to be "obsolete," or "beyond economical repair." The Subcommit-
tee was assured that the action at Robins was in accordance with these
instructions. Unconvinced by these assurances, the Subcommittee delved
further into the matter and dispatched its own investigators to Robins.
The record unearthed by the investigators plainly contradicted the in-
formation given by the Air Force on August i5, 1950. Considerable prop-
erty had been disposed of at Robins between July io, 195o, and August i,
1950. Among such property were power plants, air compressors, and con-
siderable electrical equipment. The Subcommittee felt that some of this
property might not have been sold had the revised standards been put
into effect on July io, rather than, as the investigation disclosed was the
case, on July 25.
The Subcommittee, in its second report to the full Committee, stated
that while its first inquiries to the Air Force were brushed off, it later re-
ceived full co-operation and some helpful reforms had been instituted in
tightening up disposal practices.
3. THE OMAHA ALCOHOL PLANT
In early August 1950, the chairman of the Subcommittee was informed
that the Government Services Administration (GSA) had contracted to
sell as surplus a plant in Omaha, Nebraska, which during the war had
manufactured alcohol for use in the butadiene plants of the RFC's Office of
Rubber Reserve.8 The plant had been declared surplus in May 195o, be-
fore the Korean outbreak, and was permitted to be disposed of subject to
a "national security clause" specified in the National Industrial Reserve
Act of I948. 9
The highest bid received was submitted by a newly organized com-
pany, Central States Corporation. The GSA had accepted the bid, but
title had not passed. The Subcommittee, upon learning of the proposed
sale, objected, stating that under the existing conditions the government
8 Butadiene is one of the ingredients required in the making of one type of synthetic rubber.
Butadiene is obtainable from industrial alcohol.
' 62 Stat. 1225 (1948), 5o U.S.C.A. §§ 451-62 (Supp., 195o). That clause, as applied to
alcohol-producing plants, provides that (i) the government can take over a plant whenever it
considers that its productive capacity is necessary for national security, and (2) that the plant
shall be so maintained that it can be restored to the production of industrial alcohol within
four months.
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should itself retain ownership of facilities for the manufacture of a product
so essential to the manufacture of synthetic rubber.
GSA thereupon advised the Subcommittee that the proposed sale of the
plant had been abandoned. It appears, however, that instead, GSA
changed the sale into a ten-year lease with the same Central States Corpo-
ration.-° But under the terms of the lease Central States has an option not
exercisable for three years to buy the plant at the bid price. The Subcom-
mittee stated that this hardly seemed to be an abandonment of the sale;
rather, it bound the government and gave Central States the option pe-
riod in which to find out whether or not it had made a good deal and to act
accordingly.
The Subcommittee was not at all satisfied with GSA's prudence in en-
tering into the transaction. As stated, Central States was a newly organ-
ized company. Its ability to perform was obviously unknown and its credit
was limited. It was felt, therefore, that GSA had an obligation to look
beyond the corporate shell to the principal stockholders. Those stock-
holders were represented to GSA as being individuals of substantial
means. However, inquiry revealed that GSA had entered into a long-term
lease with a corporation created and controlled by persons who held the
controlling interest in the Belvidere Distilling Company which was then
pleading financial irresponsibility in a suit instituted against it by the
Department of Agriculture. If the Omaha plant was of sufficient prepared-
ness value to be covered by the national security clause, then GSA-as the
government's agent-certainly was obligated to ascertain whether or not
Central States could carry out its contract.
The Subcommittee recommended that Central States should not be
permitted to use the Omaha plant for the manufacture of beverage alcohol
and that the government should invoke the sixty-day clause in the lease in
time to secure the entire output of the plant for the synthetic rubber
program.'
4. RESULTS OF EFFORTS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO REVISE
THE "SURPLUS" PROPERTY PROGRAM
The above incidents, as well as others, convinced the Subcommittee
that a reappraisal of the government's surplus program was essential.
"0 Under the terms of the lease the government is given the right to purchase all production
of alcohol on sixty days notice.
x The Subcommittee closely scrutinized and strongly criticized the action of the Munitions
Board and the GSA in disposing of a "surplus" alcohol plant at Kansas City, Mo. Not only
was the sale consummated during the period that GSA's publicly announced order "freezing"
disposals of surplus property was in effect, but the contract of purchase failed to contain a
national security clause. Consult note 9 supra.
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Surplus disposals were continuing on a pre-Korea basis; our reserve indus-
trial strength was being demobilized alarmingly. As a result of the Sub-
committee's efforts, together with the co-operation of the agencies con-
cerned, encouraging progress has been made.
On August i8, 195o, GSA ordered a general "freeze" with a view to the
rescreening of property for defense needs. On August 24, i95o, GSA issued
a regulation which, among other things, listed critical materials, estab-
lished standards for inventory levels, and established replacement stand-
ards for motor vehicles, typewriters, steel files, and other equipment. On
August 25, 195o, GSA drastically revised its general regulation governing
the disposal of surplus personal property. Under the revised regulation
surplus property may not be sold until express clearance is received from
GSA.12 Furthermore, the Department of Defense is required within thirty
days of notification to state whether or not it wants the property. Other
provisions of the revised regulation call for the rescreening of all property
for defense purposes and set up a system of administration designed to
facilitate closer contact in the field among government officers interested
in the disposition or acquisition of personal property which is subject to
the disposal program.' 3
The Department of Defense has also acted to correct the situation. On
September i8, 195o, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive creating
new standards for the disposal of personal property. Disposals of all prop-
erty were suspended pending a rescreening of current needs. Since October
15, 195o, each division of the Department of Defense is required to sub-
mit to a central agency all sales catalogues and invitations to bid issued
after current rescreening. These documents are then rescreened once more
for a final determination of whether or not any usable items listed can be
applied to meet requirements elsewhere. Any of the listed items which
can be used elsewhere are withdrawn from sale. In addition, since August
21, 1950, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each may repurchase personal
property previously sold as surplus.
The Subcommittee, in its second report, dated November io, 1950,
stated that it had observed genuine efforts in the Department of Defense
" Previously an agency that wanted to get rid of property would send a report describing
the property to GSA which, in turn, would send a copy to the Defense Department and make
additional copies available at its office to other agencies. If purchase orders were not received
from interested agencies within forty days, the reporting agency could sell the property as
surplus. The new regulation eliminates the forty-day provision.
3 On August 25, GSA also issued a new directive governing real property. This provides
that all agencies having excess real property and related equipment shall report it to the De-
fense Department, which in turn must take steps within thirty days to acquire the property
or certify that it is not needed for defense purposes.
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and GSA to develop procedures which, if properly administered, would
help keep vital facilities in government hands for government use.
However, the Subcommittee was not at all satisfied with the policies of
the Munitions Board. That Board posed the problem as follows:
Can the Government ... assure better operation, in an emergency, of excess industrial proper-
ties by retaining ownership of every property, or by selling, or leasing, soine properties to private
industry with retention by the government of certain rights? (Emphasis supplied).
The Subcommittee felt that the Munitions Board had created and
knocked down a "straw man." Certainly, the government should not re-
tain ownership of "every" property. The Subcommittee was of the opinion
that, generally speaking and unless there are strong countervailing rea-
sons, the Munitions Board should adopt a policy of disapproving further
disposals of industrial facilities capable of producing defense items needed
immediately for the preparedness effort. When, however, the only alterna-
tive is keeping the plant idle for a substantial period of time, sale or lease
of the properties to private interests for productive use might be appro-
priate under adequate safeguards.
IV. RUBBER
I. SITUATION AT OF OREAN INVASION
Immediately prior to the invasion of South Korea the synthetic rubber
capacity of all government-owned plants was approximately 8:17,000 long
tons, but plants in operation had an annual production capacity of only
462,500 long tons. 4 Industry stocks of all types of rubber, as of July 31,
1950, were sufficient for only about six weeks operation. The open warfare
in southeast Asia, the source of ninety-five per cent of our natural rubber,
seemed to require the stockpiling in this country of as large an amount of
natural rubber as possible. Synthetic rubber production plans did not
make available to the strategic stockpile sufficient quantities of rubber
to satisfy a realistic acquisition program. The program with regard to
natural rubber acquisitions for stockpiling had been reduced.
The Subcommittee believed that a comprehensive rubber supply and
production program should have been developed to assure the availability
of adequate rubber supplies, both natural and artificial, in the event of
war. It did not find that such a program had been adequately considered
by the authorities. It therefore explored intensively with the proper agen-
cies not only the development of such a program but the specific steps
that should be taken to carry it out. The Subcommittee also formulated
recommendations for a minimum rubber-preparedness program.
14 Actual production a few months earlier had been at a rate of less than 3ooooo long tons
a year.
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2. STEPS TAKEN TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES
a. Reactivation of Nonoperating Government-Owned Synthetic Rubber
Plants
Immediately upon formation of the Subcommittee, Chairman Johnson
urged upon the NSRB and other government officials the necessity of tak-
ing immedate steps to reactivate nonoperating government-owned rub-
ber plants. As a result, the Office of the President directed the RFC to
reactivate three synthetic rubber plants. This order had the effect of
adding annually 87,500 tons of capacity and increasing the total capacity
of the government-owned plants in operation to 550,000 long tons a
year. After conferences by representatives of the Subcommittee with
various government officials, the White House, on July 28, 195o, di-
rected an increase of government production of synthetic rubber to an
annual rate of 675,000 long tons a year. There still remained i6o,ooo tons
of idle synthetic rubber capacity, and on September i and i4, 1950, the
President ordered effective steps taken to increase synthetic rubber pro-
duction by an additional i6o,ooo long tons a year, to an aggregate of
83o,o0o long tons of annual capacity.
b. Reacquisition of Divested Artificial Rubber Producing Facilities
As noted above,' the Subcommittee was instrumental in preventing the
further sale or lease of government-owned synthetic rubber and feed-
stock producing facilities. It also urged that a review be taken of "na-
tional security" and similar clauses in government surplus sales contracts
in order that agencies might be in a position, without delay, to secure for
government utilization needed rubber and feed-stock facilities previously
sold. This suggestion has been adopted and studies were undertaken so
that the government is now in a position, when necessary, to secure for
itself an additional source of synthetic rubber producing plants and re-
lated feed-stock facilities.
c. Stockpiling of Natural Rubber
The principal purpose of reactivating the idle synthetic rubber capacity
was to make more natural rubber available to the strategic stockpile. The
determination of the amount of natural rubber that should be maintained
in our strategic stockpile rests with the Munitions Board. Records avail-
able to the Subcommittee showed that the original plans of the Munitions
Board with respect to natural rubber acquisitions for stockpiling were re-
vised downward after the invasion of South Korea. The Subcommittee
rs Page 636 et seq. supra.
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was greatly alarmed at this attitude, and on August 15, 195o, it requested
the Munitions Board to advise it as to what plans the Munitions Board
had with respect to stockpiling natural rubber. The Subcommittee re-
ceived no reply for several weeks, indicating either that the Munitions
Board had no such program, or, if the diligence with which it addressed
itself to the Subcommittee's inquiry was any criterion, that the com-
petence of the Board left something to be desired.
On August 22, 1950, the Chairman of the Subcommittee wrote the As-
sistant to the President urging, among other things, that all possible steps
be taken immediately to make more natural rubber available for our
strategic stockpile as rapidly as possible. On September 15, 1950, the Sub-
committee was advised that a new rubber-preparedness program had been
developed. Included in the program was a directive ordering studies to be
made as to what steps should be taken to accelerate purchases of natural
rubber. The Subcommittee noted that this directive was an encouraging
step, and, while studies alone would not solve the problem, it was confi-
dent that when the studies were completed, a more vigorous, effective
program would result.
d. Employment of Allocation, Specification, and Inventory Controls
The Rubber Act of 194816 empowers various government agencies to
impose allocation, specification, and inventory controls. Pursuant to such
authority, the Department of Commerce, on August 25, 1950, issued an
order designed to reduce nonmilitary consumption of new rubber to
9o,ooo tons monthly during the last four months of 195o. This was in-
tended to save approximately 15,ooo tons per month. However, the order,
generally speaking, favored the larger companies and operated unfairly on
the smaller ones. The Department, instead of revising the order to elimi-
nate the inequities and restricting the use to not more than 90,oo tons,
proceeded to grant additional quotas totalling 15,oo tons, so that con-
sumption of 1o5,oo tons monthly was authorized under an order in-
tended to cut consumption to 90,oo tons. The Subcommittee observed
that, although the policy was highly commendable, the performance
nullified the policy.
In addition, the Subcommittee was of the opinion that the initial order,
designed to reduce consumption to 90,oo tons, was not sufficiently dras-
tic. Under that order, to the extent that synthetic rubber was not avail-
able, natural rubber might be used. Thus, in the event enough synthetic
rubber might not be available during this period, the decrease in the con-
16 62 Stat. ioi (1948), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1921 et seq. (Supp., 195o).
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sumption of natural rubber would not be significant. Furthermore, al-
though the purported cut was about fifteen per cent of the rate of con-
sumption during the spring and summer of 1950, that rate was itself sub-
stantially in excess of previous prevailing rates.
The Subcommittee thereupon pressed for more realistic controls, and
on October 20, 195o, a new order was issued. The principal features of this
order were: (i) a limitation on total consumption of new rubber for non-
military purposes to 9o,ooo tons for November and December 1950, plus
rubber for defense orders which would not require more than 8,00o tons
in each of those months;'17 (2) a limitation on the consumption of natural
rubber, for both civilian and defense requirements, of 5o,ooo tons for
November and 45,000 tons for December 195o;I8 and (3) allocations of
government-produced synthetic rubber. The industry was further in-
formed that, some time in the first quarter of i95i, the allowable con-
sumption of natural new rubber for nonmilitary purposes would be re-
duced to a level of 35,000 tons per month.
e. Synthetic Rubber Research
The Subcommittee, in its first report, urged that a continuing and ag-
gressive research and development program be formulated for the purpose
of procuring new and improved types of synthetic rubber and rubber prod-
ucts. Subsequently the RFC advised the Subcommittee that a substantial
government research program is being conducted through the Office of
Rubber Reserve. The total government research budget for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1951, is about one-third larger than the budget for the
previous year, and more than one-fourth of the budget is on "fundamental
research." In its second report, the Subcommittee stated that it was grati-
fied that so substantial a proportion of the total research budget was to be
devoted to "fundamental research," since prior to World War II the
United States had been far behind both Germany and Russia in synthetic
rubber research and development.
f. Growing Natural Rubber Within the Western Hemisphere
In its first report, the Subcommittee urged the Munitions Board that
immediate steps be taken to provide a domestic source of natural rubber
as rapidly as possible. It also urged that plans for incentive production of
natural rubber in the Western Hemisphere should be drawn up promptly.
17 August and September 195o consumption was approximately ixo,ooo tons a month.
is Natural rubber consumption in August and September i 9 5o was about 65,ooo tons each
month.
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Subsequently, the Munitions Board replied that with respect to do-
mestic producton of natural rubber, the government was concentrating
on guayule as the most promising source of rubber that could be grown in
this country and that guayule seed was being stockpiled. On the basis of
other information it possessed the Subcommittee felt that this was being
done in a way by no means sufficient to supplement our natural rubber
needs in a time of emergency.
Moreover, the Munitions Board's pessimistic conclusions that "gua-
yule's manpower requirements for planting, cultivating, harvesting, and
processing of the sap are extreme," were contradicted by findings of the
Department of Agriculture. 9 The Subcommittee noted that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's work on domestic guayule rubber and Western
Hemisphere natural rubber, although on a small scale, had yielded sub-
stantial results. It concluded that inadequate consideration had been
given to these sources of our potential natural rubber supply and that this
work should be pressed forward.
Both domestic and other Western Hemisphere sources of natural rub-
ber should, in the opinion of the Subcommittee, be part of a well-organized
and co-ordinated rubber program. Accordingly, on September 12, the
Subcommittee wrote to the Secretary of Agriculture, suggesting that two
intra-governmental committees be formed, one on domestic natural rub-
ber and one on Western Hemisphere natural rubber, to formulate firm and
positive programs in these fields. This suggestion is now being actively
pursued.
g. Consolidation of Responsibility for the Rubber Program in One Agency
In the course of its study of the rubber program, the Subcommittee be-
came forcibly aware of the large number of government agencies con-
cered with the national rubber program. It was agreeably surprised that
efforts had been made to co-ordinate the work of these agencies. The Sub-
committee believed, however, that more effective results might be ob-
tained if the operation of the national rubber program was placed in one
agency as had been done in World War II.
19 The Munitions Board's letter to the Subcommittee quoted the Department of Agricul-
ture's finding that:
"Nursery costs of guayule have been cut to one-fifth of the costs during World War 1r,
improved strains have increased the yield per plant as much as 70 per cent, and the adaptability
to dry, unirrigated plains of the Southwest has been improved.... The production of a high-
quality rubber from guayule on a pilot-plant scale has been achieved. Once purified, guayule
rubber approaches hevea rubber in quality and may be found superior for certain uses. Several
Drocesses are now under investigation to make this operation commercially practicable."
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2. RESULTS OF EFFORTS OF THE SUBCON2MITTEE WITH RESPECT
TO RUBBER
The first report of the Subcommittee was submitted to the full Armed
Services Committee on September 5, 1950. Shortly thereafter, on Septem-
ber 15, i95o, the President approved a seven-point rubber-preparedness
program developed by NSRB.2' This program paralleled the recommenda-
tions of the Subcommittee in its first report. In its second report the Sub-
committee stated that the program was a minmum one. It noted that,
except for the vitally important step of reactivating all of the government-
owned synthetic rubber producing facilities, it was a study program, and
while studies alone would not solve our national rubber problem, it was a
long step in the right direction. The Subcommittee was confident that
when the studies were completed they would result in a more vigorous,
more effective program.
V. PUBLICITY
As noted above,2 the Subcommittee does not hunt headlines. But while
its reports are submitted to the full Committee and not to the Senate or to
the public, the findings of the Subcommittee are important news. Accord-
ingly, after the report is submitted to the full Committee, copies are dis-
tributed to the press, and a conference is arranged at which the sig-
nificant aspects of the report are explained. Present at each conference are
members of all the national press associations, as well as reporters of
individual newspapers and news magazines. In this manner, the public is
apprised of the facts respecting the accomplishments, as well as the short-
comings, of the national defense efforts undertaken by the government.
Press comment on the achievements of the Subcommittee has been uni-
20 The major points of the program were: (i) Maximum synthetic production. Immediate
reactivation of all remaining idle synthetic rubber producing facilities; (2) Stockpiling. Studies
were ordered of (a) our total military and civilian rubber requirements in the event of total
mobilization, (b) a realistic objective for stockpiling of natural rubber and accumulating in-
ventory of synthetic rubber, and (c) how the needs of those objectives could best and most
promptly be met; (3) Increased purchases. Studies were ordered as to what steps should be
taken to accelerate our purchases of natural rubber and how our purchase techniques could
be improved; (4) Modernivation. Studies were ordered to determine (a) what steps for modern-
izing and increasing synthetic rubber facilities should be taken, and (b) whether it would be
desirable to construct additional petroleum-butadiene facilities in substitution for presently
owned alcohol-butadiene plants; (5) Domestic production. Studies were ordered to determine
what steps should be taken to provide for the production of natural rubber in this country and
procurement of natural rubber from other countries in the Western Hemisphere; (6) Feed-
stocks. Studies were ordered of steps necessary to provide feed-stock materials for the synthetic
rubber program; (7) Streamlining. Studies were ordered to determine whether the national
rubber program could be streamlined and simplified by placing all the powers regarding it
in a single agency.
21 Page 635 supra.
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formly favorable.- The importance of such reaction, in the opinion of the
Subcommittee, is that the pressure of public opinion will cause the adop-
tion of those of its policies which the public approves.
It is, of course, still too early to evaluate the final accomplishments of
the Subcommittee. Nevertheless, in the short period of its existence, it has
succeeded in vitalizing important phases of the preparedness program.
Perhaps one of the most important contributions of the Subcommittee is
the mere fact of its existence. Those responsible for our mobilization effort
know that a "watchdog" is ceaselessly sniffing about in their vicinity and
that it has a deep and sensitive allergy to any scent of "complacency on
the Potomac."
Consult, e.g., N.Y. Times § i, p. 3o, col. 5 (Sept. x8, I95o); St. Louis Post-Dispatch § 3,
p. i, col. 5 (Oct. 8, I95o); 56 Time, No. I, at 24 (Sept. I8, ig5o).
